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I. INTRODUCTION

The literature on “agency discretion” has, with a few notable
exceptions,1 largely focused on substantive policy discretion,2 not
procedural discretion.3 In this essay, we seek to refocus debate on
the latter, which we argue is no less worthy of attention. We do so
by defining the parameters of what we call Vermont Yankee’s “white

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.
1.
See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890,
1919 (2016) (offering a compelling theoretical justification for judicial deference to agency
decisions about procedure); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Substance and Procedural
Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens
in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979) (arguing that formal procedures are not necessary
to resolve technical questions related to the regulation of carcinogens).
2. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies Running from Agency Discretion, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 97 (2016) (exploring agency reluctance to exercise discretion under the
Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act); Jody Freeman & David
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing agencies'
strategic use of existing statutory authority to tackle novel problems). See also Ming H. Chen,
Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 87 (2016) (examining the legitimacy of expansive executive actions under existing
immigration statutes); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548
(2016) (describing congressional delegations of authority permitting an agency to forbear from
implementing statutory provisions).
3. Notable exceptions include Elizabeth Magill's work on agencies' discretion to make
policy by rulemaking or adjudication, M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking
Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004), and Adrian Vermeule’s recent essay exhorting
and defending judicial deference to agency procedural choices. See Vermeule, supra note 1.
Vermeule provides a detailed review of existing doctrine on agency freedom to determine what
process is due under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1890–95. Vermeule then defends lessintrusive rationality review for these choices as consistent with both Dworkinian principles
of coherence and Elyian ideas about representation-reinforcement. Id. at 1911, 1923. Fundamentally, Vermeule’s essay focuses on the institutional allocation of authority to determine
the outer boundaries of agency procedural discretion that are established by constitutional
norms. Id. at 1893–95. In this essay, we seek to expand the analysis of agency procedural
discretion beyond constitutional bounds to include statutory, executive, and non-legal limits,
thereby providing a fuller picture of the phenomenon.
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space”—the scope of agency discretion to experiment with procedures within the boundaries established by law (and thus beyond
the reach of the courts).4 Our goal is to begin a conversation about
the dimensions of this procedural negative space, in which agencies
are free to experiment with new approaches without judicial oversight. We also explore some of the ways in which energy and
environmental agencies are innovating within these boundaries.
Process matters. In discussing the Vermont Yankee decision,
then-Professor Antonin Scalia wrote of “the indissoluble link between procedure and power.”5 Indeed, the power to design process
is in many cases the power to dictate, or at least to affect, substantive outcomes. Procedural innovation can therefore be an important
tool for agencies seeking to fulfill their statutory mandates.
Part II briefly expands on the scope of the project. Part III then
shifts from abstraction to specifics, examining ways in which the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) have exploited their considerable
freedom to experiment with process. Much has been made of the
ways in which these agencies are using aging statutory mandates to
address modern problems.6 We note the same trend but propose that
focusing on substantive policies tells only part of the story. Energy
and environmental agencies are also moving beyond procedural
minima to take advantage of, for example, new technologies and
developments in organizational theory. These procedural innovations are enabling the agencies to achieve goals more efficiently and
effectively and to emphasize aspects of their mandates that they, in
their expert judgment, find to be most significant.
Parts IV and V—the heart of the essay—enumerate six categories of limitation on procedural discretion: constitutional, statutory,
judicial, executive, administrative (as where an agency limits its
4. Vermont Yankee held that courts may generally not impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond those contained in the APA or their authorizing statutes. Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (noting
“the very basic tenet of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own
rules of procedure”). That ruling was recently reaffirmed in the Mortgage Bankers case, in
which the Supreme Court reversed a line of D.C. Circuit cases requiring agencies to submit
revised interpretations of their own rules to notice and comment. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015). In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Court noted that
the D.C. Circuit doctrine “improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the APA’s
maximum procedural requirements.” Id. at 1201; see also New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v.
Sebelius, 753 F. Supp. 2d 103, 121 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that “agencies are, of course, free to
adopt additional procedures as they see fit”).
5. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 346 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, FERC's Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783 (2016) (noting both the history of and new opportunities for
assertion of FERC's authority under existing statutes); Freeman & Spence, supra note 2;
Daniel J. Fiorino, Streams of Environmental Innovation: Four Decades of EPA Policy Reform,
44 ENVTL. L. 723 (2014) (describing policy innovations at EPA across four decades).
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own discretion), and non-legal. In Part IV, we touch briefly on
constitutional considerations, which have been thoroughly explored
by Vermeule and others.7 We then consider how the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and various other statutes may limit an
agency's discretion to adopt innovative procedures. Next, we explore
separate requirements imposed by the courts, notwithstanding
Vermont Yankee's admonition that courts may not require agencies
to adopt procedures beyond those enumerated in the APA. Finally,
we turn to procedural constraints originating with the President.
In Part V, we argue that the absence of significant legal limitations
does not necessarily invite arbitrary procedural decisionmaking.
In this Part, we address two types of limitation on procedural discretion that are less well studied: agencies’ self-imposed constraints
and non-legal constraints. We conclude by inviting additional research into the scope and uses of agency procedural discretion.
II. THE PROCESS/SUBSTANCE DICHOTOMY
To make any argument about the scope of agency procedural
discretion it is first necessary to define our terms. When we propose
a category of “procedural” discretion, we do not mean to argue
that the line between substance and process is always a clear one.
However, the categories are at least conceptually distinct and we
find that there are enough “easy cases” to preserve the utility of the
distinction.
Here, we start with the definition of “procedural rules” proposed
by Larry Solum, who analogizes them to H.L.A. Hart's “secondary
rules”: those that define institutional powers to make laws and rules
(as opposed to primary rules, which require people to do or abstain
from doing certain things).8 This definition distinguishes between
the so-called “rules of the legal game”—the rules that apply to actors
inside legal institutions—and the rules of conduct that apply to
members of the general public.9 We note that this definition is broad
enough to include agency rules of practice that shape the conduct
of members of the regulated community and the public, not in
their substantive activities, but in their interactions with the agency
itself.
We find support for this definition in the APA’s distinction
between so-called legislative rules and “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”10 In distinguishing between the two,
7.
8.
9.
10.

See supra note 1.
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 208–09 (2004).
Id.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
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the D.C. Circuit employs a “functional analysis” rather than obsessing about labels.11 The main purpose of the distinction is to
ensure “that agencies retain latitude in organizing their internal
operations.”12 Thus, “the exemption's critical feature is that it covers
agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests
of parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties
present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.”13
But let us move from the abstract to the concrete. We subdivide
agency “procedures” into two categories of rules. First, such procedures include rules that govern the agency's internal operations,
including rules governing commission voting, for example, or structuring collaboration with other agencies. We also conclude that
such internal rules include decisions about how to allocate scarce
resources, including but not limited to enforcement prioritization.14
Second, they include external rules to the extent that those rules
govern interactions between the public and the agency. Examples
here are rules for participation in rulemaking, for submitting license applications, and the like.15
Procedural choices are inextricably intertwined with substantive ends. Procedures that increase agency transparency or facilitate public involvement in agency decisionmaking may serve democratic and participatory goals. Procedures that induce additional deliberation or reliance on expert opinion by agency decisionmakers
may serve the goal of nonarbitrary government decisionmaking.
And procedures that speed up decisionmaking processes may serve
efficiency goals. In fact, if you push on any procedural rule, you will
11. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
12. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
13. Id. Other circuit courts have similar rules. See, e.g., Brown Express, Inc. v. United
States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1979) (identifying legislative rules as those that have
“a substantial impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of the members or the
products of that industry”). This definition recalls the Erie test for distinguishing between
process and substance, most recently articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in Shady
Grove. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (stating
“[w]hat matters is what the rule itself regulates, and if it governs only the manner and the
means by which the litigants' rights are enforced, it is [procedural], but if it alters the rules
of decision by which the court will adjudicate those rights,’ it is [substantive]”).
14. Courts analyzing APA section 553's exception for procedural rules have reached a
similar conclusion. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that a series of agency directives and manuals defining enforcement strategy of
review boards was covered by the exception).
15. When political scientists talk about the congressional manipulation of agency
process as a mechanism of control, they sometimes include structural features in that definition. See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices
About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62 (1995) (including in the definition of procedure such design features as “which agency makes the decision, how the agency
is organized, what qualifications are required for key personnel, and how the agency relates
to the rest of the bureaucracy”). However, because our perspective is internal to the agency,
and because agencies frequently have little to no control over such structural attributes, we
do not include them in the discussion here.
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find a substantive policy underlying it.16 This suggests not that the
line between procedure and substance is not worth drawing, but
that we should be attentive to the substantive consequences of
procedural rules. Indeed, that is why procedural discretion matters:
process choices not only reflect but further substantive values.17
III. PROCEDURAL INNOVATION AT EPA AND FERC
Because of the values it serves and because of its substantive
effects, procedural innovation should not be overlooked. And agencies do experiment with procedure, as a series of examples from two
key environmental and energy agencies should make plain. We first
explore three innovations at the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), which has tended to exercise its procedural discretion to
increase understanding about the agency's activities as well as to
expand the impact of its work. Meanwhile, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has adopted unconventional strategies
for improving the quality of its regulatory product.
EPA has been highly innovative when it comes to the agency's
public outreach and educational efforts. For example, EPA held
“listening sessions” across the country during the roll-out of its
proposed Clean Power Plan rule, which imposes greenhouse gas
emissions limits on existing power plants.18 Stakeholders selected
for their “expertise in the Clean Air Act standard-setting process”
were invited to participate in roundtable discussions to provide feedback on the proposed rule. Transcripts and recordings of the meetings were made available to the public.19 Such sessions are not
legally required, but so long as they do not run afoul of ex parte
requirements, they do not violate existing law.20 This additional
discussion with stakeholders, above and beyond what is required by
the notice-and-comment process in the APA and by other statutes,
can improve the substance of final rules as well as generate public
buy-in for agency actions.
16. Relatedly, as the Court noted in Shady Grove, most procedural rules do affect
federal litigants' substantive rights. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.
17. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85,
85 (1982) (arguing that procedures that protect against deprivation of a substantive right
effectively describe the strength of that right).
18. Clean Power Plan: Past Listening Sessions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/past-listening-sessions (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). The
Clean Power Plan, of course, is now tied up in the courts and its fate remains uncertain. Order
Granting Application for a Stay at 1, Chamber of Commerce v. EPA (2016) (No. 15A787),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/020916zr3_hf5m.pdf.
19. Clean Power Plan: Past Listening Sessions, supra note 18.
20. EPA has its own internal rules governing ex parte contacts. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
“EX PARTE” CONTACTS IN EPA RULEMAKING (1985) (requiring that all comments and any
information likely to affect the final decision be placed in the public record).
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EPA has also been innovative when it comes to publicizing
its rules and programs via the Internet and social media.21 Such
efforts are “procedural” in that they do not alter the substance of
EPA's programs, merely the form of their dissemination. And EPA's
statutes do not specifically require the agency to engage in such
outreach efforts.22 Annual appropriations acts tend to prohibit
EPA from using appropriated funds for propaganda or lobbying purposes, and the agency has sometimes run afoul of these prohibitions
in expanding its social media presence.23 However, other aspects
of EPA's campaigns have survived legal scrutiny, including its
expenditure of nearly $65,000 on video and graphics to promote its
“Waters of the United States” rule that refined EPA jurisdiction
over navigable waters.24 By reaching out to the public on modern
technology platforms, EPA is encouraging increasing understanding
of its programs as well as promoting civic engagement.
EPA has also exercised what might be called, in a nod to Daphna
Renan, intra-agency power “pooling”25: the concentration of various
substantive agency authorities to achieve more powerful results.
In its “Making a Visible Difference in Communities” program, EPA
targets “environmentally overburdened, underserved, and economically distressed areas where the needs [for support] are greatest.”26
The agency then draws on its diverse expertise and authority in,
for example, remediation of polluted sites, redevelopment of brownfields, stormwater and waste management, and collection and dissemination of environmental quality data, to mitigate environmental harms in those areas.27 The focusing of such efforts within a
single community to achieve broader health and sustainability
goals demonstrates the power of procedural decisions, in this case
resource allocation, to support substantive aims.

21. Elizabeth Porter and Kathryn Watts have written about one aspect of these
efforts: the use of visual media to enhance communication. Elizabeth G. Porter & Kathryn A.
Watts, Visual Rulemaking, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1183 (2016). See also Stephen M. Johnson,
#BetterRules: the Appropriate Use of Social Media in Rulemaking, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing the limits legal limits on EPA's use of social media).
22. However, statutory support for these activities may be found in both the National
Environmental Education Act of 1990 and in the E-Government Act of 2002. National
Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5501–5510 (1990); E-Government Act of 2002,
44 U.S.C. §§ 101, 3501, 3601, 41 U.S.C. § 266a.
23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-326944, LETTER TO SENATOR JAMES INHOFE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY—APPLICATION OF PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA AND
ANTI-LOBBYING PROVISIONS (2015).
24. Id. at 2.
25. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015) (arguing that
presidents can exploit joint agency activities to expand their own powers).
26. Smart Growth: Making a Visible Difference in Communities, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/making-visible-difference-communities (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
27. Id.

Spring, 2017] VERMONT YANKEE’S WHITE SPACE

529

EPA is not alone in its procedural innovation. FERC, which
unlike EPA operates as an independent commission, is the nation's
regulator of wholesale electric energy and natural gas, among other
responsibilities. The agency has been in the news over the last
several decades for its substantive policy innovations. Perhaps most
significantly, it has used existing statutory authority to restructure
both wholesale natural gas and electricity sales to more closely
resemble a free market.28 But FERC's procedures, while perhaps
less likely to capture the public imagination, are also worthy of
regard. This section will describe three innovative procedures at
FERC that are deserving of greater attention. The first two are procedures for better ventilation of ideas and strategy early on in
agency processes. The last concerns error-correction within the
agency prior to legal challenge in court.
First are technical conferences. These are public meetings
during which invited panelists make presentations to the commission on topics of the commission's choosing. Such conferences are
not required as part of the rulemaking process, either by the APA
or under the various energy statutes that FERC implements. The
conferences may relate to an ongoing rulemaking or simply to a
matter about which the commission desires to know more.29 The
agency will typically issue notice of the technical conference as part
of the relevant docket along with a description of the topics to be
addressed and questions to frame the discussion. The conferences
are open to the public and are frequently made available via webcast
and archived for several months.30
Technical conferences are a valuable mechanism for both gathering information from stakeholders and for giving those stakeholders insight into policies the agency is considering prior to more
formal agency action. For example, technical conferences can provide a forum for discussing priorities in areas of overlapping
jurisdiction.31 In terms of the input participants are afforded, these

28. See Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing SelfImplementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commission’s Regulations, 59 FERC ¶
61,030 (1993). Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory
Transmission Service by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996).
29. See, e.g. FERC, Technical Conference to Discuss Competitive Transmission Development Rates (Docket No. AD16-18000) (June 27–28, 2016); Technical Conference to Discuss
Implementation Issues Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Docket
No. AD16-16-000) (June 29, 2016).
30. Archived webcasts are available at FERC Live Video & Audio Webcasts and
Archives, FERC, http://ferc.capitolconnection.org/ (last accessed Apr. 18, 2017).
31. See Julia E. Sullivan, The Intersection of Federally Regulated Power Markets
and State Energy and Environmental Goals, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 474, 475 (2015)
(citing Notice of Joint Technical Conference, Joint Technical Conference on N.Y. Mkts. &
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conferences fall midway between negotiated rulemaking, which
involves participants much more actively in rule formation,32 and
EPA's webinar series, which educates participants about preliminary or final rules after those rules are published.
Second, FERC offers pre-filing meetings during which potential
parties may review their draft filings with FERC staff prior to
submitting them formally to the agency. Parties who may wish
to avail themselves of this option include companies submitting
rate filings as well as consumers wishing to file a complaint against
a utility. Nothing in the agency's governing statutes or rules
requires them to offer this service. However, the meetings are useful
on both sides. Companies or consumers are able to incorporate
changes suggested by the agency that can improve the quality of
their filings. And the agency itself can get a better feel for the precise nature of the results sought than they could glean from paper
filings alone. Thus, they are better able to process the filings once
submitted.33
Finally, FERC frequently adds another stage to the standard
rulemaking process: rehearings that often result in issuances of
revised rules. Both the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act
require potential litigants to seek rehearing at the agency before
challenging a FERC action in court. But neither statute requires the
agency to grant these requests. Over the years, however, FERC has
been inclined to grant such petitions so long as they raise plausible
questions about an aspect of a rule's validity or desirability. Doing
so has become part of the agency culture, and it is common for
complex or controversial rulemakings to be issued in successive
iterations with titles such as “Rule 719-A,” “Rule 719-B,” and so on.
Rehearing can be helpful to industry and other parties if it
creates greater certainty as to the scope and meaning of the underlying rule. However, the advantages of rehearing do not accrue
solely to stakeholders. For the agency, rehearing provides an opportunity to clarify aspects of the underlying rule or to correct mistakes.
These clarifications might either avoid litigation or strengthen the
agency record so that the rule is more likely to survive a challenge
Infrastructure, No. AD14-18-000 (F.E.R.C. Sept. 17, 2014) https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/EventDetails.aspx?ID=7531&CalType=&
CalendarID=116&Date=11/05/2014&View=
Listview, archived at http://perma.cc/VS26-TMGQ).
32. For an overview of negotiated rulemaking, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (finding that negotiated rulemaking fails to improve agency timeliness or reduce litigation).
33. Information about this process comes from conversations with senior FERC staff.
FERC has interpreted these meetings as fully consistent with the agency's Ex Parte Rule,
Order 607, 88 FERC ¶ 61,225 (1999), which prohibits only off-the-record communications with
decisional employees after the commencement of any contested, “on the record,” trial-type
proceedings. See MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co,, et al., 118 FERC ¶ 61,003, 61,007–10
(2007).

Spring, 2017] VERMONT YANKEE’S WHITE SPACE

531

in court. While rehearing is itself costly in terms of time and
resources, it may avoid the even greater costs associated with
litigation.
None of the innovations discussed in this section are required
by law, but neither are they prohibited by it. They were enacted in
the discretionary space beyond the law's procedural minima. While
no individual process may be radical, collectively these adjustments
and innovations can facilitate achievement of an agency's substantive goals over time. But how much room do agencies actually have
to innovate in this space? It is to that question that the next Part
turns.
IV. THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES OF AGENCY
PROCEDURAL DISCRETION
To understand the realm of agency procedural discretion, we
must begin by identifying its outer boundaries. These boundaries
are established, first and foremost, by the law, which imposes various limitations on the ability of an administrative agency to design
its own procedures. There are four key sources of legal limitations
on agency procedural discretion: the Constitution, statutes, judicial
precedent, and executive edicts. Within these boundaries, administrative agencies are typically afforded substantial latitude to design
their own procedures, subject to minimal judicial intervention.
The Constitution is the foundational legal restriction on government action generally, and its minimum requirements apply in
the administrative context. Key for our purposes here is the wellestablished principle that agencies must observe the requirements
of constitutional due process in designing administrative procedures.34 These constitutional requirements are modest, but agencies
must consider them in the procedural design process. Agencies
may even have an independent duty to “interpret and implement
the U.S. Constitution,” a phenomenon that has been referred to
as “administrative constitutionalism.”35 An agency designing its

34. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
35. Agencies are thus required to “interpret and implement the U.S. Constitution,”
a phenomenon that has been referred to as “administrative constitutionalism.” See Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (2013); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 26–27 (2010); Elizabeth Fisher, Food Safety Crises as Crises in Administrative
Constitutionalism, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 55 (2010); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799,
801 (2010); see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 519, 529 (2015) (“Agencies’ constitutional value judgments, made in the process
of interpreting statutes, are what I define as ‘administrative constitutionalism.’”).
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procedures must therefore first consider the minimum requirements imposed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.36
The Due Process Clause applies only if an agency’s action threatens
to deprive an individual of an interest in life, liberty, or property.37
In such circumstances, the minimum procedures due to the individual, as well as the timing of those procedures (e.g., pre- or postdeprivation), are determined based on a flexible and contextspecific evaluation of the agency action in question.38 Relatively
few administrative disputes are resolved on due process grounds,
however, and thus other sources of legal limitation on agency
procedural design play a more significant role in shaping agency
procedural design and experimentation.39
Moving beyond the Constitution, a key source of statutory
restriction on agency procedural discretion is the APA. There are
two possible interpretations of how the APA affects agency procedural discretion. First, the APA may be understood as a skeletal
framework that establishes only minimum procedural requirements
against a background norm of agency procedural discretion.40 So
interpreted, the APA establishes only a “floor” for administrative
procedures. Agencies are empowered to impose more restrictive,
detailed, or additional procedures beyond those contained in the
APA, provided that the statutory minimum is observed.41 Second,
the APA might instead be understood as a statute designed to
produce procedural uniformity across agencies.42 Achieving uniformity would require an interpretation of the APA as more restric-

36. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, § 4. The Due Process Clause is central to our analysis
because we are focused on administrative procedure. But administrative constitutionalism
occurs under many other constitutional provisions as well. E.g., SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014) (examining how the
National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Communications Commission interpreted
and implemented the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (examining the FCC’s scheme for regulating speech,
which required the agency to consider limitations imposed by the First Amendment).
37. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672–74 (1977).
38. See generally RICHARD J. PERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3 (6th ed. 2014).
39. Id. at 206.
40. E.g., Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 349 (1st
Cir. 2004) (“The APA lays out only the most skeletal framework for conducting agency
adjudications, leaving broad discretion to the affected agencies in formulating detailed procedural rules.”).
41. See, e.g., Energy Bar Association, Report of the Committee on Ethics, 12 ENERGY
L.J. 421, 426 (1991) (explaining that FERC’s rules limiting certain types of ex parte communications “are more restrictive than under the APA, but this is permissible because the APA
establishes a floor, not a ceiling, for prohibited ex parte communications”).
42. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (“The APA was meant to bring
uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity.”).
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tive, imposing not only a “floor” but also a “ceiling” for administrative procedures.43 Under this interpretation, agencies must not
only meet the APA’s minimum requirements, but their discretion to
deviate from the procedures established by the statute would be
restricted. It is also possible, of course, that the APA should not be
interpreted monolithically, and that some provisions of the APA
may be interpreted to establish a floor, while others may be interpreted to establish both a floor and a ceiling.44
In recent decades, however, courts and scholars have increasingly understood the APA according to the first approach: as a
skeletal framework that leaves substantial latitude for agency
procedural innovation.45 There is some evidence that, at least with
respect to certain discrete subjects, this consensus marks a shift
away from a contrary view that dominated in the decades immediately following the APA’s enactment.46 For example, such a shift has
43. On this point, institutional context matters. For example, Vermont Yankee has been
described as holding that the APA’s informal rulemaking provisions establish both a floor and
a ceiling. See David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index
Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 126 (2005). But what is typically meant by this is that
the APA’s informal rulemaking provisions establish a ceiling from a judicial perspective, such
that it is inappropriate for the courts to impose upon agencies procedural requirements
beyond those found in the statute. Laura Anzie Nelson, Delineating Deference to Agency
Science: Doctrine or Political Ideology?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1057, 1070 n.90 (2010). From the administrative perspective, the APA’s informal rulemaking provision establishes only a floor,
such that agencies may voluntarily choose to observe additional procedures. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312 (1970) (“In Vermont Yankee . . . we held that courts
could only in ‘extraordinary circumstances’ impose procedural requirements on an agency
beyond those specified in the APA. It is within an agency’s discretion to afford parties more
procedure, but it is not the province of the courts to do so.”); Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 76-3, Procedures in Addition to Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in
Informal Rulemaking, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,654 (July 19, 1976) (encouraging agencies to voluntarily observe notice and comment procedures beyond those contained in the APA).
44. Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1300 (2012) (“[A] fundamental compromise underlying the APA was that Congress
imposed greater procedural rigor and judicial scrutiny only on more formal agency proceedings, leaving less formal proceedings, such as notice and comment rulemakings, subject
to minimal constraints.”). It is also worth noting that a general understanding of the APA’s
purpose and operation might emerge only piece-by-piece, as individual provisions addressing
distinct subjects are examined by courts and commentators. See infra notes 9 and 10 and
accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 703 F.2d 447, 451 (10th Cir.
1983) (“[A]dministrative agencies retain substantial discretion in formulating, interpreting,
and applying their own procedural rules.” (citing Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv.,
397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970)); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1439 (2004) (“The skeletal provisions of the APA that governed informal
rulemaking required no elaborate process.”); Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 264
(1987); James V. DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State,
72 VA. L. REV. 399, 445 (1986) (“The APA’s judicial review formula has served admirably for
forty years, but it provides no more than a skeletal framework for control of agency action.”).
46. But see Jennifer Nou, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative CostBenefit Analysis, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 601, 617 (2008) (“Facilitating implementation, the
drafters of the APA were clear that its minimal procedural requirements were not a ceiling
but a floor.”). There is also some evidence that Congress intended the APA to establish only
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occurred in connection with the APA’s provision authorizing federal
agencies to issue declaratory orders “to terminate a controversy
or remove uncertainty.”47 Due to this provision’s placement in the
section of the APA governing formal adjudication, courts and
commentators for many decades took the view that declaratory
orders were available only in formal adjudication.48 Over the last
several decades, however, the courts have quietly abandoned this
approach, allowing agencies to issue declaratory orders (1) without
first conducting a “hearing on the record” and (2) to address matters
not subject by statute to formal adjudication under the APA.49
This change in how the declaratory orders provision is understood
has not occurred wholly in isolation, but rather seems to reflect a
broader shift in how the APA is understood and applied.50
Beyond the APA are other statutes, both trans-substantive
and subject-specific, that may also confine agency procedural discretion.51 Trans-substantive statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the Government in the Sunshine Act, for example, limit an agency's ability to
shield its deliberations and its written materials from public view.52
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires all federal
agencies to assess the effects of actions that may have a significant
impact on the human environment.53 And the Endangered Species
Act requires federal agencies to consult with either the Fish and
Wildlife Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration before taking actions that could jeopardize the continued

a minimum, but that it expected that courts and not agencies would be the relevant institutional actors establishing requirements above the statutory minimum. See Kenneth Culp
Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3,
12 (1980) (explaining that the Senate “must have meant that courts could add to the [APA’s
minimum] requirements, for a statement that an agency imposes ‘requirements’ on itself is
unnatural.”).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2012).
48. See TOM C. CLARK, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 59 (Reprint ed. 1973); Emily S. Bremer,
The Agency Declaratory Order, OHIO ST. L.J. 19–24 (forthcoming 2017), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2955214.
49. See Weinberger v. Hynson, 412 U.S. 609, 624–25 (1973); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t
of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 796–97 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2015-3, Declaratory Orders, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,163 (Dec. 16, 2015) (urging agencies
to use declaratory orders more frequently and creatively and suggesting best practices and
procedures in declaratory proceedings).
50. See supra note 46.
51. A commonly cited example is hybrid rulemaking requirements, which Congress has
imposed upon individual agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission. See MagnusonMoss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 STAT.
2183 (Jan. 4, 1975).
52. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Government in the Sunshine
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012).
53. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).

Spring, 2017] VERMONT YANKEE’S WHITE SPACE

535

existence of any endangered or threatened species.54 Agency-specific
statutes may also impose restrictions. The Federal Power Act, for
example, contains a series of specific requirements governing rate
challenges and hearings.55 And the Clean Air Act requires that
specific procedures be followed in the summoning of witnesses to
testify in agency proceedings.56
These statutory requirements are often understood to operate in
a manner similar to the APA, in the sense that they are viewed as
establishing procedural floors, not ceilings (except in specific cases
where Congress has clearly indicated the converse).57 The fact that
NEPA established a floor rather than a ceiling for procedures to
evaluate environmental impacts, for example, may be seen in
its compatibility with state environmental assessment statutes
(sometimes called mini-NEPAs), some of which go beyond NEPA's
own requirements.58 Like the APA, then, these statutes typically
leave agencies free to experiment with procedures that elaborate
upon the statutory minima. Furthermore, that Congress has repeatedly enacted these statutes imposing upon individual agencies
unique requirements not found in the APA suggests some acceptance or expectation that there will be at least some variation
in agency procedures, even for similar activities.59
A third source of legal restrictions on agency procedural discretion is judicial precedent. Courts have a significant role in interpreting the APA and other procedural statutes, and two variants of legal
restriction on agency procedural discretion may arise from the
judiciary’s fulfillment of that role. First, judicial precedent may
simply interpret and apply statutory requirements in a manner that
displaces agency interpretation. Second, and more controversial,
is what is termed “administrative common law,” which arises when
courts create procedural requirements that are not found in applicable statutes.60 Administrative common law is controversial in part
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012). Agencies must also cooperate to the maximum extent
practicable with states before acquiring land or water to preserve endangered or threatened
species. Id. § 1535.
55. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012) (requiring commission to fix by order the time
and place of a rate hearing and specify the issues to be adjudicated).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012).
57. See, e.g., Richard Cordray, Forward: Consumer Protection in the Financial Marketplace, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 309 (2015) (“We believe that the seemingly formulaic
processes laid out in the APA and the [Dodd-Frank Act] merely create a floor on collaboration
and public input, not a ceiling.”).
58. See Council on Envtl. Quality, State NEPA Contacts, DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/09/f2/States_NEPA_Like_22June2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2017) (listing contacts for states with NEPA-like planning requirements at).
59. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 499, 572 (2011).
60. See Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV.
1215, 1244–48 (2014); Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative
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because it appears to be in tension with the principle established by
the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee (and recently reaffirmed in
Mortgage Bankers Association) that courts should not impose upon
agencies procedures beyond those required by statute.61 In Vermont
Yankee, as discussed above, the Court found “little doubt that Congress intended that the discretion of the agencies and not that of the
courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices
should be employed.”62
Then-Professor Scalia's critique of the opinion notwithstanding,63 Vermont Yankee's central holding has stood the test of time.
Yet, some administrative common law is consistent with Vermont
Yankee. This is because the Court acknowledged that the general
principle does not “necessarily [mean] that there are no circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency
action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those
required by the statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are
extremely rare.”64 Much administrative common law nonetheless
operates beyond this narrow exception. Indeed, it is widely recognized that, despite Vermont Yankee, the courts have imposed a
variety of additional requirements on informal rulemaking.65 This
is often referred to as a judicial gloss on the APA,66 and it has been
lamented as a significant contributing factor to the “ossification” of
that process.67
Fourth and finally, executive edicts may also impose legal
limitations on agency procedural discretion. There are a number of
executive orders that impose procedural requirements on agency

Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2011); see also Metzger, supra note 44, at 1295 (“By administrative
common law, I am referring to administrative law doctrines and requirements that are largely
judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the President, or individual
agencies.”).
61. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
62. 435 U.S. at 546.
63. Scalia, supra note 5 (criticizing the decision's apparent reverence for the APA as the
“Magna Carta” of administrative procedure and offering historical, doctrinal, and institutional reasons for permitting courts to require additional agency process).
64. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524.
65. The necessity of judicial imposition of these requirements was evident to some at
the time of the Supreme Court’s decision. See Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1816 (1978).
66. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 2 n.1, (2009) (referring to the D.C. Circuit's “hard look” review
as a judicial gloss on the meaning of the APA's arbitrary and capricious test); M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) (noting the importance of the judicial gloss on the APA for courts reviewing agency action); Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1997)
(claiming that “the judicial gloss on the APA has taken on a large significance over time”).
67. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN.
L. REV. 59, 65–66 (1995).
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action, often in the context of rulemaking.68 For example, Executive
Order 13,132 requires agencies to consider the potential effects on
federalism when they are drafting regulations.69 More famously,
Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to conduct benefit-cost
analysis for economically significant regulations.70 Other controls on
agency procedures are exerted through the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), which is located within the Executive Office
of the President.71 One such control is the review of significant
proposed and final rules conducted by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs. This review may substantially influence individual agencies’ rulemaking processes.72 Finally, the president’s budget
process may also limit agency procedural discretion.73
Over the decades, there has been a shift towards broader recognition of the agencies’ authority to establish their own procedures.74
As an initial matter, agencies have a significant role in interpreting
the laws that establish the boundaries of their procedural discretion. For example, the practical reality is that administrative agencies are usually the first and often the last arbiters of what process
is due under the Constitution. This is because such administrative
constitutionalism is frequently not subject to judicial review and,
when the courts do review it, they are often deferential to the agent’s
judgment.75 Courts have similarly adopted a deferential stance towards agency interpretations of statutes they are authorized to administer.76 This includes recognition that Chevron deference applies
to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory “jurisdiction.”77

68. See generally Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory
Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,800, 47,801–02 (Aug. 10, 2012) (discussing various
regulatory analysis requirements imposed by statute and executive order).
69. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999); see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012); Admin. Conf. of the U.S.,
Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of State Law, 76
Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011).
70. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
71. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2247
(2001).
72. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929, OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF
AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS (2003),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf.
73. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control,
125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016).
74. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1911–19 (analyzing three streams of precedent
in which courts have been deferential to agencies’ procedural judgments).
75. See id. at 1891–92; see also Freeman & Spence, supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
76. For example, unless a statute uses the magical words “hearing on the record,”
a court is likely to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own statute as not
requiring formal adjudication under the APA. See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v.
Johnson, 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2006).
77. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
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V. NON-LEGAL LIMITS ON AGENCY PROCEDURAL DISCRETION
The absence of any legal restriction on agency action might
be interpreted, wrongly, to indicate that an agency has limitless or
unfettered authority to act.78 In practice, there are a variety of nonlegal restrictions on agency procedural discretion, including agency
self-regulation, structural constraints, reputational constraints,
and professional constraints.79 In the absence of significant legal
restrictions on agency procedural innovation, these “soft” constraints play a larger role in defining Vermont Yankee's white space.
The first category of constraints includes those that are self-imposed or self-regulatory. Elizabeth Magill defines a self-regulatory
activity as an agency action “to limit its own discretion when no
source of authority (such as a statute) requires the agency to act.”80
Agencies may themselves adopt rules ex ante that constrain their
ability to innovate procedurally.81 For example, the Food and Drug
Administration adopted guidelines for the issuance of guidance
documents—in essence, guidance for guidance—that were later
codified pursuant to the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.82 And FERC has limited its ability to exercise
enforcement discretion by issuing a policy statement on civil penalty
guidelines.83 In some cases, even less formal agency conventions
might limit the agency's ability to shift its practices without warning.84
Beyond self-imposed rules, three additional categories of constraint limit agency freedom to innovate procedurally: collaborative
constraints, reputational constraints, and professional constraints.
78. See, e.g., Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902) (“The establishment of a clearly
defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word
for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action.”).
79. For an argument that the President, too, is bound by such non-legal constraints,
see ADRIAN VERMEULE & ERIC POSNER, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010) (citing the reelection
constraint, in particular, as cabining executive authority).
80. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 861
(2009) (explaining why agencies might engage in self-limiting behavior). While Magill identifies “extra” procedures as forms of self-regulation, it is crucial to understand that procedure
can be used to expand agency power as well as to limit it. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 25.
81. Emily Hammond and David Markell have written of the promise of “inside-out”
legitimacy, or the ability of administrative process to substitute for judicial review in legitimating administrative action. Emily Hammond & David Markell, Administrative Proxies
for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313,
327–28 (2013).
82. Food & Drug Admin., Administrative Practice and Procedures Good Guidance
Practices 65 Fed. Reg. 56,468 (Sept. 19, 2000).
83. FERC, Revised Policy Statement on Penalty Guidelines, 132 FERC ¶ 61,216
(Sept. 17, 2010).
84. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
548 (1978) (stating that past agency practice permited the court to review and overturn the
rulemaking proceeding).
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First are collaborative constraints. When agencies operate in shared
regulatory space, they may be subject to structural constraints on
their procedural discretion. Shared regulatory space is created when
Congress delegates to more than one agency power to undertake the
same or similar functions or otherwise to operate within a single,
larger area of regulatory responsibility.85 Joint agency authority
may limit agency discretion, including the discretion to innovate
procedurally. This is partly due to the necessity for agencies to coordinate their activities in shared regulatory space, such as through
joint rulemaking, interagency agreements, and agency consultation
agreements.86 When the task at hand is to determine the best or
most prudent action (and not just to identify the outer limits of
permissible action), disagreement among agencies that share
authority may impose a real limitation.87
In the energy and environmental space, consider EPA's implementation of its Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (limiting the
emission of toxic air pollutants from existing power plants) to allow
certain power plants extra time to comply.88 Although nothing in the
Clean Air Act required it to do so, EPA adopted a strategy, laid down
in a policy memorandum,89 of consulting with FERC reliability
experts before deciding whether to grant an extension request.
While it did not acknowledge expressly that failure to consult
85. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012).
86. See generally Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2012-5, Improving
Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, 77 Fed. Reg., 47,810 (Aug. 10, 2012) (recommending procedures and best practices for using these and other approaches to improving
agency coordination in shared regulatory space).
87. One example arises in connection with the selection, appointment, and supervision
of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Here, one agency (such as the Social Security Administration) has statutory authority to administer an adjudicatory program, while another
agency (the Office of Personal Management (OPM)) has statutory authority to regulate the
selection, appointment, and supervision of the ALJs who will preside over the hearings within
that adjudicatory program. This division of authority is intended to preserve the independence of ALJs by introducing into administrative adjudication some separation of functions.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1302(a), 1305, 3105, 3304, 3323(b), 3344, 4301(2)(D), 5372, and 7521
(2012); see generally VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW (2010); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A
Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111 (1981). OPM’s fulfillment of
its statutory responsibility constrains the adjudicatory agency’s discretion to appoint and control its ALJs. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND PLACEMENT OF ADJUDICATORS IN
THE FEDERAL SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 27–32 (March 31, 2014) [hereinafter EEOC
REPORT], https://www.acus.gov/report/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-evaluating-status-and-placement-adjudicators-federal.
88. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories,
49 C.F.R. § 63 (2017). See Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
89. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement
Response Policy For Use of Clean Air Section 113(a) Administrative Orders In Relation To
Electric Reliability And The Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (Dec. 16, 2011),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/mats-erp.pdf.
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with FERC on reliability might lead to inter-agency friction,90 the
implication was clear.
Even where the agency has itself adopted no formal or informal
limits on its ability to innovate procedurally, reputational concerns
may counsel restraint. Daniel Carpenter has argued that agencies
act with their reputations in mind with a goal of preserving a maximum of power and authority over the longer term. 91 And one of us
has argued elsewhere that agencies sometimes exercise Bickelian
“passive virtues”—restraint in the face of discretion—due to fear of
reputational consequence.92 For example, if an agency believes that
holding too many public meetings on a given topic (say climate
change), would subject it to unwanted scrutiny by the political
branches, it may limit such meetings even where it would be well
within its authority to hold them. Strategic agencies will look beyond particular decisions to the best way to conserve authority and
discretion in the longer term.93
Finally, professional constraints limit agency procedural decisions. One understanding of “discretion” is, as the Supreme Court
has explained, “the absence of a hard and fast rule” that would
deprive an agency of a choice of how to act.94 But “discretion" can
also mean the exercise of sound judgment in decisionmaking.95
Although discretion may be unconstrained by the law, courts, or
other non-legal constraints, therefore, it is still constrained by good
judgment.96 An individual agency’s professional culture and norms
90. See id. at 2 (noting only that it elected to consult with FERC “in light of the
complexity of the electric system”).
91. See DAN CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) (arguing that the FDA's awareness of its
reputation has shaped its operations over the years).
92. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State's Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV.
565 (2014).
93. Id. at 569.
94. 2 Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931) (citing The Steamship Styria v. Morgan,
186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902)).
95. For adoption of this meaning in case law, see, e.g., Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531,
541 (1931) (“When invoked as a guide to judicial action, it means a sound discretion, that is
to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and
equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of
the judge to a just result.”); see also Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 (1902) (quoting dictionary
definitions of “discretion” to make the point that its exercise entails the application of reason
and sound judgment). See also Discretion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2003), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discretion (last visited Apr. 18, 2017)
(defining discretion as, among other things, “the quality of having or showing discernment or
good judgment” and the “ability to make responsible decisions”).
96. For this reason, even in areas in which agencies possess significant procedural
discretion, successfully encouraging agencies to innovate requires giving those agencies comfort that innovation is lawful and within the scope of their discretion. See, e.g., Admin. Conf.
of the U.S., Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg.
48,789, 48,790 (“With respect to the issues addressed in this recommendation, the APA
contains sufficient flexibility to support e-Rulemaking and does not need to be amended for
these purposes at the present time. Although the primary goal of this recommendation is to
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may also limit procedural experimentation beyond what is optional.
Certain agencies have made headlines for their innovative cultures,
but others can be conservative in their procedural choices.97 Even
at relatively innovative agencies, fidelity to established modes of
operation can serve to limit experimental overreach.98
VI. CONCLUSION
Agency procedural innovation is a regular feature of today's
bureaucracy. And it takes place largely without judicial supervision.
Even for those who fear too much agency autonomy, however, there
is little cause for alarm. Notwithstanding the considerable white
space left by Vermont Yankee and other legal constraints, agencies'
discretion to adopt new procedures is still circumscribed. Because
of the non-legal constraints identified in the previous section, we
believe that we are unlikely to see procedural experimentation
descending into arbitrariness.
The interdependence of substance and procedure cuts in favor
of recognizing broad agency procedural discretion. How an administrative system is designed will have a significant impact on whether,
how, and in what way a substantive statutory mandate is fulfilled.99
To restrict an agency's procedural discretion may often have the
effect of restricting its substantive authority. This may be especially
so in light of the resource constraints under which agencies must
operate. Procedural design requires the exercise of expert judgment
regarding how best to optimize available resources and prioritize
competing statutory commands.100 Agencies are better situated
than courts to make these judgments, in part because they have
more complete, systemic information about the industry or subject
they regulate and the way that various administrative approaches
may work (or not) in that context.101 This comparative institutional
advantage provides further justification for courts, Congress, and

dispel some of the legal uncertainty agencies face in e-Rulemaking, where the Conference
finds that a practice is not only legally defensible, but also sound policy, it recommends that
agencies use it.”).
97. P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., 2014 BEST PLACES TO WORK IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
ANALYSIS 2 (2015) (performing an assessment of innovation at federal government agencies
and concluding that six agencies had a “disproportionately high impact” on the overall innovation score). In this survey, less than a third of federal employees who were looking for ways
to be more innovative felt that creativity and innovation were rewarded. Id.
98. See John. D. Dilulio, Jr., Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a
Federal Government Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 277 (1994) (arguing
for the relevance of agency culture in shaping bureaucratic action).
99. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1921.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1922.
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the executive to embrace a background norm of agency procedural
discretion.102
On the other hand, embracing agency procedural discretion may
further contribute to the proliferation of a wide diversity of administrative procedures throughout the administrative state. While
experimentation can lead to discovery of more effective, efficient
governmental tools, it may also undermine uniformity and transparency, making it harder for courts, Congress, and the public
to understand how the administrative state as a whole operates.
Although an agency may have superior information about its own
activities and regulatory space, it lacks a broader systemic perspective across agencies. This downside to broad agency procedural
discretion, however, can be addressed through means other than
increased judicial enforcement of uniformity. Attention to crossagency procedural issues may help to break down the silo effect and
enable agencies to consider broader systemic considerations as they
design their own procedures. This may be accomplished through
scholarly attention to systemic procedural issues, as well as through
executive action to facilitate cross-pollination of procedural best
practices across agencies.103 These activities can help to reduce
unnecessary and harmful variation. They can also offer efficiencies
by identifying procedures that have been successfully tested by one
agency and can be used equally successfully by other agencies faced
with similar issues.
One major downside of the dearth of judicial oversight in this
area, however, is that procedural innovation has received limited
scholarly attention. We think that is a mistake. Research that offers
a systemic, cross-agency perspective will enable the sharing of
valuable procedural innovations across agencies. By identifying
procedures that have been successfully tested by one agency, and
can be used equally successfully by other agencies faced with similar
issues, scholarship can help agencies capitalize on the promise of
procedural innovation while promoting a degree of uniformity
across agency practice that enables greater public understanding of
and access to federal administration.

102. Judicial deference to agency decisionmaking is often justified on the basis of the
“expertise-based comparative institutional advantage” of agencies. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
& Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 517 (2011).
103. The Administrative Conference of the United States is an institution well-designed
and positioned to fulfill this role. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 591–96 (2012).

